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Policy research on African agriculture is long on prescriptions on what needs to be done 
to reverse negative growth trends but short on how such prescriptions might be 
implemented in practice.  This paper addresses this state of affairs, focusing on the role 
and impact of research in agricultural policy processes. 
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Bridging Research, Policy, and Practice in African Agriculture 
 
The current relationship between agricultural research and agricultural policy in Africa is 
disturbing.  Research capacity has been both pushed and pulled out of government.  It has 
been pushed out by pitiful terms of employment and lack of basic resources for 
productive work.  Increasing donor support for quasi-private research institutes and for 
policy advocacy NGOs has pulled it out.  Interactions between agricultural policy makers 
and agricultural researchers are increasingly marked less by cooperation and restraint and 
more by self-indulgence and arms-length critique.  Policy research on African agriculture 
is therefore progressively long on prescriptions for what needs to be done to spur 
agricultural growth but short on how such prescriptions might be implemented in practice 
(Omamo, 2003).  Anecdotal evidence points to little use of research output by African 
agricultural policy makers, and thus limited policy influence for research.  What explains 
this state of affairs?  What might be done to correct it, and, most important, how? 
In addressing these questions, this paper does not seek to provide an exhaustive 
country-by-country description of agricultural policy formulation and implementation in 
Africa.  Rather, through a review and assessment of the literature on the role and impact 
of research in policy processes, the paper identifies concepts and actions that hold 
promise for improving research-policy linkages in African agricultural policy contexts. 
Agricultural policy processes in Africa have yet to be systematically described.  
To build understanding of the central features of some of these processes, the next section 
develops a policy fable set in Uganda, where the author currently lives and works.  While 
purely fictional, the fable captures the social and political context within which   4
agricultural policies are debated, formulated, and implemented in many African 
countries.  The results of a comprehensive review of major schools of thought on how 
research enters into policy processes are then presented.  The review suggests high 
potential returns to fundamental reconceptualizations of how research enters policy 
processes; interactions among the nature of research-based evidence, the context within 
which policy is made, and available facilitation mechanisms appear to be decisive.  
Implications for research and capacity strengthening are then drawn. 
 
Background Conditions: A Policy Fable From Uganda and Beyond 
The Washington, DC-based International Agricultural Development Research Institute 
was in trouble.  The Board of Trustees wanted someone’s blood—Phil Henman’s blood.  
As Director General of IADRI, Henman had presided over a third straight year marked 
by major budget cuts.  Once again, lofty promises from donors had proved to be just 
that—promises, most of which were broken almost as soon as they were made.  Henman 
knew the source of the problem.  IADRI had run out of ideas.  The place had gone stale.  
It had happened so quickly, though.  Suddenly, IADRI was no longer an opinion leader, 
an innovator, a pacesetter.  Nobody invited Henman to deliver keynote addresses 
anymore.  He did not have anything new to say.  He knew that he needed new staff.  
More than half of IADRI’s senior staff was over 60 years old.  These were men who were 
well past their best, and all earning large salaries.  He needed younger, hungrier people; 
more women; more from developing countries.  Without those kinds of changes in 
personnel, without the new ideas such changes would inject, nobody would give IADRI 
any new money—not on the scale needed to turn things around.  But Henman could not   5
simply dismiss his aging staff members… not all at the same time.  That would be too 
disruptive, and it might scare away some of IADRI’s more conservative but reliable 
donors, with whom the older staff members had strong ties.  He was stuck. 
So when Simon Bailey of USAID called to say that he wanted IADRI to provide 
technical and organizational backstopping for a major USAID project in Africa, Henman 
agreed right away.  It would mean that each year at least $5 million would pass through 
IADRI.  That would yield roughly $800,000 from overhead charges.  In addition, the 
costs of three senior staff members would be covered by the project.  That would silence 
some people on the Board’s Finance Committee.  The project’s coverage of ten African 
countries would help address the Program Committee’s criticism that IADRI had become 
too Latin America- and Asia-focused, at the expense of Africa.  The only complication 
was that proposed project would be driven by the low-external-input sustainable 
agriculture (LEISA) concept.  Simon Bailey of USAID was much taken by the LEISA 
idea.  Henman had his doubts.  He was not aware of any country in the world that had 
managed to transform its economy based on low-input agriculture.  But on the other 
hand, Henman was also aware that extant constellations of output and input prices in 
most African countries rendered most high-input practices unprofitable.  There was 
clearly scope for LEISA-type solutions to poverty in Africa, but how much was far from 
clear.  On balance, Henman felt there was enough in the LEISA idea to build a fairly 
comprehensive program around. 
Henman’s first instinct was to name a relatively new arrival from Cornell, Miriam 
Moyo, as Project Leader.  A Zimbabwean by birth, Moyo had studied LEISA systems in 
Burkina Faso and had developed a balanced view of the subject.  Henman had also heard   6
that the International Food Policy Research Institute was courting her.  He could not 
afford to lose her.  To keep her, he would have to give her more opportunities to grow.  
Leading the LEISA-Africa would be ideal.  But USAID’s Bailey had made it clear that he 
wanted a Project Leader with whom he could easily relate.  So Henman gave the project 
to Stan Jensen—60 years old, ex-Peace Corps (Gambia, 1970-72), ex-World Bank, 12 
years at IADRI. 
* * * 
When Stan Jensen called with the offer to participate as Uganda Team Leader in a 
5-year, 10-country project, Dr. Kodet Martin, a senior lecturer in the Department of 
Agricultural Economics at Makerere University in Kampala was immediately interested.  
Kodet had met Jensen during a visit to Washington to present a project report at the 
World Bank.  They had immediately struck up a good relationship.  Jensen reminded 
Kodet of one of his former professors at the University of Wisconsin.  Kodet’s quick 
mind and direct speech were like a breath of fresh air to Jensen, whose time at the World 
Bank had made him forever wary of what he saw as Africa’s overly critical and 
pretentious educated classes. 
“Martin, we want to change the way people view and talk about agricultural 
development in Africa,” said Jensen as he concluded his LEISA-Africa pitch to Kodet.  
“African solutions to Africa’s problems—that’s the only way forward.  It’ll be excellent 
to have you on board as the Uganda Team Leader.” 
“Yes, yes,” said Kodet.  “It certainly sounds like an attractive project.  I would be 
happy to play that role.”   7
“That’s great!” said Jensen.  “Simon Bailey and I will be coming that way next 
month.  We can talk more then.  Now, listen.  We need to promote high-level buy in.  Do 
you think you could set up some meetings in Uganda for us?” 
“Certainly.  What kinds of people do you want to meet?” 
“We’d love to meet senior officials in all the relevant ministries.” 
“Like Directors and heads of department?” 
“Yes, that would be fine.  But I was thinking more in terms of Ministers and 
Permanent Secretaries.” 
“Oh… I see.  OK.  I’ll work on it.” 
“Please do.  We are trying to put together a donor coordination meeting in The 
Hague, right before the trip to Africa.  The more donors who contribute, the better.  It’ll 
be nice to be able to say to them that we’ll be meeting with Ministers and Permanent 
Secretaries when we’re in Africa.” 
* * * 
Honorable Adupa Antonia, Uganda’s Minister of Rural Development, was an 
uncompromising workaholic, not well liked by her cabinet colleagues for her bluntness 
and dismissive attitude to protocol and social niceties.  Three years into her second 
cabinet assignment—after four years in the Tourism and Trade docket—Honorable 
Adupa (or “Double-A” as she was popularly known) had hosted many such delegations.  
They always gave her a headache.  She did not like the way Dr. Kodet was behaving—
grinning like a hyena.  The meeting was already three minutes old and he was still 
introducing people.  The Minister was not sure about this LEISA-Africa project.  
Something about it did not sound right.  She had instructed her Permanent Secretary,   8
Prof. Tumwebage Caiphas, to take on the visiting team—press them a bit.  She wanted to 
hear all sides.  When Dr. Kodet paused to catch his breath, Double-A shot an impatient 
look at Tumwebage, who quickly stood up and thanked the guests for coming, gesturing 
to Kodet that he should stop and sit down. 
“How can I help you?” the Minister asked Bailey.  She could tell he was the real 
leader of the delegation.  “Please be brief and to the point.” 
“Thank you, Honorable Minister.  In short, we would like your support for our 
initiative, which I believe you know about, so I will not go into the details.” 
“Yes.  OK.  What do you want to achieve through this project?  Why is it good for 
Uganda?  Why not operate like other donors and support the Uganda government’s Plan 
for Modernization of Agriculture, which I am sure you know about?  Why not simply 
support the PMA?  Again, be brief please.” 
Bailey handled the first two questions with ease.  He had been thinking about the 
answers for a long time.  The PMA question was harder. 
“We just concluded a very successful meeting in The Hague with a range of 
bilateral and multilateral donors to Uganda and other African countries.  From that 
meeting, you can be confident that the LEISA-Africa initiative is not a USAID-only 
affair.  We intend to work very closely with other donors.  I am sure you will agree that 
there are many constraints facing Uganda’s rural sector.  Some of those will be addressed 
under the PMA, but many will not.  We fully support the aims of the PMA and view the 
LEISA-Africa initiative to be wholly in line with the PMA’s goals.”   9
“Was there a Uganda government representative at this meeting in The Hague?  I 
did not hear about it.  Did you, Professor?” asked the Minister, looking at the PS, who 
shook his head.  Only he could tell how irritated she was. 
“Um… no,” said Bailey, wishing he had not mentioned the donor meeting. “It 
was a donor coordination meeting… to exchange notes on our various plans for Uganda, 
and so on.” 
“I see.  We have a donor coordination group here in Uganda, under the PMA.  
You should have begun there.  Anyway, let us move on.  Professor Tumwebage, do you 
have any reactions to what Mr. Bailey has told us?” 
“Yes please,” said the PS, turning to address Dr. Kodet whom he held in high 
regard based on their past work together. “Dr. Kodet, to us this is a very peculiar project.  
Why are you advocating continued subsistence-oriented agriculture at a time when we 
want to modernize our economy via a modernized agriculture?  In your own report to the 
PMA Agricultural Sector Task Force—the one you prepared last January—you made the 
point that we should be aiming for a structural transformation of the economy driven by 
ever-increasing degrees of specialization in all economic activity, leading to trade-based 
growth.  We valued that report very highly and refer to it very often.  It gave us hope 
since the signs of a transformation are there.  For instance, demand for fertilizer is 
increasing rapidly.  Imports almost doubled between 1997 and 2001.  Again, this is 
something you pointed out to us.  So this LEISA-Africa project is confusing.  It seems to 
be heading in the exact opposite direction to where we want to go under the PMA.” 
Sensing danger, Bailey gestured toward Jensen, encouraging him to respond, 
effectively silencing Kodet, who had been collecting himself for a response.   10
“Actually, there’s more to it than that,” Jensen began.  “I think a key thing to 
remember is that there are large numbers of highly impoverished people for whom 
specialization and all that it entails are simply beyond reach.  While the PMA—with its 
emphasis on promoting commercial agriculture—might be able to reach some of these 
people, most of them will fall outside its ambit.  Such people will be the focus of concern 
for the LEISA-Africa project.  So there is really no conflict at all between the ideas 
underpinning the PMA and those driving the LEISA-Africa initiative.” 
“That is not quite right,” countered Double-A.  “The PMA has many pro-poor 
features built into it.  But even if that were not the case, why not add such components to 
the PMA?  Why do you want to develop a whole new initiative that will place added 
administrative burdens on our government?” 
Jensen was silent and studiously avoiding Bailey’s eyes.  Bailey could think of no 
immediate response. 
“Honorable Minister, you know last weekend I went home to Karamoja to see my 
mother who has been unwell.  On my way back, about 25 kilometers from my village—
which is in a very remote area—I got a puncture.  As I was changing the wheel, a fellow 
appeared from a nearby homestead to help.  It was quick work after that, and soon we 
were finished.  My hands were dirty, so this fellow suggested that I accompany him to his 
home, where he would give me some water for washing.  I was not keen to leave my car 
there, but he had been so kind, and he was so eager for me to go with him, I agreed.  His 
homestead was only about 200 meters from the road so we got there quickly.  What I 
found there was stunning.  The man was growing all kinds of things—vegetables, fruits, 
potatoes and so on… right there in that dry and desolate place.  It was like an oasis… or   11
at least how I imagine an oasis must appear.  I couldn’t believe it and said as much.  He 
was of course very proud and pleased and eager to talk about his achievements.  So I sat 
there for about an hour, eating his fruits, while he lectured me about water management 
in water-scarce farming systems like his.  The goal, he explained, was to minimize 
disturbance to the soil while simultaneously opening it up to allow rainfall infiltration.  
So he had abandoned the plough and invested instead in an animal drawn ripper and sub-
soiler.  The rest, he said, was down to timing of operations, weeding, mulching, and using 
Dolicos lablab as a cover crop—yes, Dolicos lablab!  Can you imagine!  Anyway, every 
drop of water is used.  Rainfall is caught where it drops.  He uses no fertilizer, no 
improved seed.  But using these techniques—which he learned from an NGO whose 
name I have forgotten—he has been able to turn his life around.  This fellow will never 
be a commercial farmer.  There is no market anywhere near him.  And I don’t think there 
will be any market there for 10 or even 20 years.  But he is now food secure and no 
longer a burden to society, or to the government.  That is what the LEISA-Uganda 
project will be about.” 
“OK, Dr. Kodet,” said the Minister, nodding, half-smiling.  “That is a very 
interesting story; a very wise story, under the circumstances.” 
Kodet had known that the story would resonate deeply with Double-A.  She, too, 
hailed from one of Uganda’s dry northerly regions.  Any project that sought to improve 
conditions in those marginalized areas was good news to her. 
“OK,” continued the Minister.  “I will support this.  But to ensure that there is no 
wasteful duplication or canceling out of effort, I want you to commit to full participation 
in the relevant PMA sub-committees.  Let me also offer some words of caution.  Under   12
the PMA, we are struggling to translate good concepts into effective actions.  I wonder if 
you appreciate how complicated this project of yours will be.  How are you going to 
reach all those impoverished farmers?  Do you think we haven’t also been trying to do 
that?  If you really take this LEISA idea seriously, you will encounter great challenges in 
implementation.  I certainly wish you well, and, again, I will support you as appropriate.  
Please continue with your preparations.  You will now please excuse us.  Thank you very 
much for coming.” 
 
Research in Policy Processes: Major Schools of Thought 
By definition, the fable deliberately overstates and stylizes, but only to sharpen a point, 
which in this case is that food and agricultural policy in Africa is developed under 
conditions of high ambiguity, poorly established and ambiguous knowledge bases, and 
high numbers of possible choices facing decision makers.  These conditions therefore 
also define the content and conduct of agricultural policy processes.  Numerous 
anecdotes about agricultural policy formulation suggest similar conclusions.  Yet little is 
known either about agricultural policy processes, or about the roles, if any, played by 
research and researchers within them.  To bring structure to such considerations, and to 
set the stage for efforts aiming to fill knowledge gaps, this section describes six schools 
of thought on how research enters into policy processes and thus about research-policy 
linkages: the rational model; pragmatism under bounded rationality; innovation diffusion; 
knowledge management; impact assessment; and evidence-based-practice. 
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The Rational Model 
In the dominant model of how research enters into policy processes—and of the role 
played by research in these processes—policy making proceeds rationally via a series of 
logical ordered phases.  Policy makers comprehensively canvas, assess, and compare all 
options, calculating all social, political, and economic costs and benefits of alternative 
public policy options and then choose the best one.  Policymaking is therefore framed as 
problem solving, implying the need for extensive communication and consultation in 
which experts and expert opinion are decisive.  Research—i.e., data collection and 
analysis—is central, aiming to provide policy makers with certainty by examining all 
policy options and presenting their assessments of the best (Stone et al., 2001; Sutton, 
1999).  This model—the so-called rational (or rational-comprehensive) model—suggests 
a natural partnership between policy makers and researchers.  Policy makers are 
confronted with problems they need to resolve.  But lacking the information needed to 
make progress, they turn to researchers for solutions.  Researchers undertake the required 
analyses and present policy makers with the answers.  Policy makers receive the expert 
advice, digest it, design the suggested policy measures, and implement them accordingly. 
The rational model therefore assumes a balanced, objective, and analysis-based 
process involving at least three phases: an agenda-setting phase in which key problems 
are placed on the policy agenda; a decision phase in which research is central; and an 
implementation phase.  Agenda setting involves recognizing and defining the nature of 
the issue to be dealt with, and identifying possible courses of action.  Decisions are based 
on assessments of the relative advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives.  
Implementation involves action, including evaluation of outcomes.   14
But what if policies do not achieve their intended impacts?  The rational school 
explains this very common outcome as arising from lack of political will, poor 
management during implementation, insufficient resources, or other such departures from 
the assumed logical, ordered, and well-endowed process.  While these explanations for 
policy failure or inadequacy may be intuitively appealing, they are also troubling.  For, as 
signaled in the fable from Uganda, they also define current conditions in most policy 
environments in Africa.  A model of policy making that explains policy failure purely in 
terms of exogenous factors clearly suffers from important conceptual limitations.  Several 
such limitations have been identified.  As illustrated in the fable, knowledge is never 
neutral, apolitical, or uncontested.  Experts disagree among themselves on data, methods, 
and conclusions.  The expert opinion that emerges as decisive is not always the most 
objective or scientifically unassailable.  Even then, as the fable demonstrates, science-
based advice is not necessarily palatable or paramount to policy makers, whose aims are 
often limited to satisfying immediate public demands expressed via political processes, 
not maximizing long-run social gains as assumed by many analysts (Nielson, 2001; Stone 
et al., 2001). 
The rational model also departs from reality in its assumption that researchers 
take implementation seriously.  Seldom are researchers’ so-called “policy options” 
submitted to a feasibility test of any sort.  Lapses into ideal but operationally irrelevant 
reasoning are therefore common (Omamo, 2003).  In the rare cases where operationally 
feasible alternatives to existing arrangements are identified, seldom do analysts attempt to 
ascertain their real net gains to society if introduced—i.e., as opposed to hypothetical net 
gains that arise from comparisons of actual conditions with hypothetical ones?  Clearly,   15
large disparities between actual and hypothetical gains signal opportunities.  But 
preoccupation with hypotheticals comes at the cost of operational irrelevance 
(Williamson, 2000).  These facts combine with resilient existing policies, high 
information acquisition and processing costs, and the generally low predictive power of 
social science in leading to policies that are more parochial and myopic than would be 
expected were the rational model an accurate portrayal of the world. 
 
Pragmatism Under Bounded Rationality 
A sharply contrasting view of the role of research in policy processes springs from the 
observation that uncertainty is a central fact of all human activity.  As with all decision 
makers operating in uncertain environments, policy makers likely spend the bulk of their 
time looking for ways to address the problems posed by that uncertainty.  To the extent, 
therefore, that policy makers identify any solution at all to a given problem, that solution 
is likely not an optimal one, nor was it intended to be (Heiner, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1993). 
Two kinds of uncertainty are relevant: substantive uncertainty—which is related 
to lack of relevant information about environmental events—and procedural 
uncertainty—which concerns gaps in requisite problem-solving abilities (Dosi and Egidi, 
1991).  The rational model considers only the former kind of uncertainty.  The implicit 
assumption is substantive uncertainty but procedural certainty.  Specifically, policy 
makers are viewed to be unaware of all possible realizations of states of the world.  But 
they are assumed to be able to make the best possible use of the information available to 
them.  Where possible, they transform uncertainty into risk and act according to the 
relevant probability distribution of a specific set of outcomes.  Where such a   16
transformation is not possible, indecision and non-action may result.  The possibility of 
gaps in policy makers’ “information processing” abilities is not admitted, whether they 
are assumed to face familiar or unfamiliar situations.  But as illustrated in the fable, new 
problems are unfamiliar by definition.  In considering whether and how to overcome 
these problems, policy makers face conditions that require that they imagine situations 
that have never occurred before and thus require of them abilities and attributes that they 
likely have never had cause to build up.  Successful design and implementation of new 
policy measures are therefore far from trivial, as implicitly assumed in the rational model. 
The key recognition is that understanding alternative (competing) policy options 
implies both substantive and procedural uncertainty for policy makers.  They may indeed 
respond “rationally” to these two kinds of uncertainty.  But this “rational” behavior does 
not necessarily mean “most robust” or “most efficient” in an optimizing sense.  Rather, 
procedural uncertainty and competence limitations mean that these responses will 
represent “institutionalized” behavior—institutionalized in the sense that policy makers 
will bounded-rationally settle on relatively stable “rules” or “routines” that are context-
specific but to some extent event-independent (Winter, 1982).  Routines thus are specific 
to particular classes of problems, and to the people and the organizations who have 
developed them.  The transferability of these routines across people or organizations is 
defined by their degrees of tacitness and the nature of the knowledge involved in their 
original generation and implementation.  Routinized behavior is not only efficient; under 
both substantive and procedural uncertainty it is likely more so than behavior emerging 
from optimizing procedures (Dosi and Nelson, 1994; Heiner, 1993; March and Simon, 
1993).   17
In this schema, substantive and procedural uncertainties (and the routinized 
behavior that they elicit) are viewed to lead to policymaking that is inherently 
conservative and incremental.  Rarely do policy makers have the time, resources, or 
inclinations to consult with researchers.  Civil servants and politicians are entirely 
pragmatic.  They aim to ensure that government can function, cope with demands from 
pressure groups, and respond to crises.  Pragmatic, rule-based policy making therefore 
tends toward avoidance of potentially costly innovation or departures from routine 
practice, and either marginal alteration of existing policies or reactive policies that aim to 
address problems that have already arisen (Sutton, 1999). 
This is a compelling viewpoint.  It certainly provides more insight into the 
outcome in the fable than does the rational model.  But with its prediction of conservative 
policy making, this viewpoint would struggle to explain the upheavals in agricultural 
policy witnessed over the last two decades in Africa. 
 
Innovation Diffusion 
Lying behind the rational model is the image of a “policy cycle” comprising problem 
definition and agenda setting, formal decision making, policy implementation, 
evaluation, and then back to problem definition and agenda setting, and so on.  The 
policy cycle metaphor suggests that the central question to be answered in efforts to 
bridge the research-policy divide is, “How can research be transported from the research 
sphere to the policy sphere?”  The search for answers concentrates on the form and 
content of the “message” and the nature of research-policy interactions.  However, the 
large literature on diffusion of innovations suggests that a more powerful metaphor is that   18
of a “policy journey” in which the central question is, “Why are some ideas that circulate 
in research and policy communities picked up and acted upon while others are ignored 
and disappear?”  The search for answers to this question concentrates on patterns of 
innovation attributes that influence adopters, on how organizational structures affect 
potential adopters’ capacities to innovate, and on stages in innovation processes (Crewe 
and Young, 2002; Nielson, 2001; Nutley et al., 2002). 
An innovation is an idea, practice, or object perceived as new by an individual or 
other unit of adoption (Rogers, 1995).  Perceptions and persuasion are therefore crucial.  
Two kinds of knowledge are distinguished: first, the knowledge that defines the nature of 
the innovation; second, the knowledge held by potential adopters.  The process of 
diffusion is considered to revolve around four elements: an idea or innovation; channels 
of communication to spread knowledge about the innovation; time during which 
diffusion takes place; and a social system of potential adopters (Rogers, 1995; Walter et 
al., 2003b). 
Why, then, are some ideas that circulate in research and policy communities 
picked up and acted upon while others are ignored and disappear?  This literature 
identifies five attributes of innovations as decisive in their diffusion and uptake: relative 
advantage – the extent to which an innovation is perceived to have significant advantage 
over current alternatives; compatibility – the degree to which an innovation is seen as 
being consistent with past practices, current values, and existing needs; complexity – the 
extent to which an innovation can readily be understood and easily implemented; 
trialability – the extent to (and associated cost with) which a new idea can be tried out 
prior to being taken up; and observability – the degree to which the uses and benefits of   19
an innovation are visible to others, and therefore the degree to which such uses and 
benefits can act as stimuli to uptake by others (Stone et al., 2001).  The underlying 
hypothesis would therefore be that the greater an innovation’s relative advantage, the 
greater its compatibility, the lower its complexity, the greater its trialability, and the 
greater its observability, the greater its chances of adoption and rapid diffusion.  The 
fable from Uganda suggests grounds to support such an hypothesis.  But consider the 
agricultural market reform agenda that was swallowed whole by government after 
government in Africa.  The reform agenda was certainly simple to explain and 
implement; governments simply washed their hands of the agricultural sector.  But what 
was its relative advantage?  How compatible was it with prior policy practices, values, 
and needs?  Recent reversals of key market reform policies suggest both low relative 
advantage and low compatibility (Jayne et al., 2002).  Yet across Africa, policy 
prescriptions that spring simplistically from the market mantra continue to be put forward 
and accepted (Omamo, 2003; World Bank, 2000). 
 
Knowledge Management 
Companies, industries, and countries with efficient and effective decision making 
systems can gain decisive advantages, and vice versa.  The field of enquiry examining 
knowledge management has developed in response to that recognition, focusing on 
processes for creating, acquiring, storing, transferring, and applying knowledge, and on 
processes of organizational learning and change.  A key notion in this literature is that 
competitive advantage resides in knowledge application rather than in knowledge   20
possession.  The ultimate aim of knowledge management is therefore better use of 
knowledge to improve organizational performance (Nutley et al., 2003a). 
Two kinds of knowledge are typically distinguished: explicit and tacit.  Explicit 
knowledge is codified (written down)—e.g., in documents and databases.  Tacit 
knowledge accumulates from experience, is intangible, and is concerned largely with 
“how things get done.”  Also typically distinguished in the knowledge management 
literature are knowledge-push (supply-driven) and knowledge-pull (demand-driven) 
approaches.  Knowledge-push approaches identify knowledge and information flows as 
key therefore target improved structures and processes for capturing, codifying, and 
transmitting knowledge.  Knowledge-pull approaches identify stakeholder engagement as 
paramount and focus instead on reward systems and other mechanisms to encourage 
stakeholders to share, search for, and apply knowledge  (Court and Young, 2003). 
The interplay of tacit and explicit knowledge is viewed to be crucial in decision-
making processes.  Four modes of knowledge conversion between explicit and tacit 
knowledge have been identified, resulting in four potential knowledge-driven collective 
outcomes: socialization – where individual tacit knowledge is converted to group tacit 
knowledge to produce sympathetic knowledge; externalization – where tacit knowledge is 
converted to explicit knowledge to produce conceptual knowledge; internalization – 
where explicit knowledge is converted to tacit knowledge to produce operational 
knowledge; and combination – where separate explicit knowledge is combined to produce 
systemic knowledge.  Socialization starts with building a field of interaction.  
Externalization is triggered by meaningful dialogue or collective reflection.  Networking   21
triggers combination.  Internalization is triggered by learning-by-doing (Nutley et al., 
2003a). 
With increasing recognition of the need for greater attention to knowledge-pull, 
issues in social capital development are growing in importance.  Increasing attention is 
therefore being paid to structures and processes that might promote social capital 
accumulation—such as the numerous agricultural research and policy networks that have 
been formed in Africa in recent years.  Most of these networks explicitly or implicitly 
aim to build social capital as a bridge to socialization, externalization, internalization, and 
combination (and thus to sympathetic knowledge, conceptual knowledge, operational 
knowledge, and systemic knowledge).  The fable illustrates the importance of such 
networks and the social capital they generate and sustain in policy processes.  The fable 
also illuminates the potentially decisive roles of tacit knowledge and social capital in 
policy processes. 
Given the prominence of the rational model and the envisioned role of research in 
the policy cycle, knowledge-push models and techniques dominate the literature.  
Criticisms leveled at the rational model therefore also apply here, in addition to 
objections to over-preoccupation with codification of explicit knowledge, and 
corresponding lack of attention to the tacit knowledge so crucial to coping with the 
uncertainty deeply embedded in policy systems. 
 
Impact Assessment 
Influencing policy and, by extension, policy makers is often an explicit aim of 
researchers.  Donors and research commissioners are increasingly concerned about the   22
impact of the research that they fund and commission.  A large number of researchers 
have therefore devoted considerable effort to building understanding of how research 
outputs are utilized or otherwise, and to measuring any impacts from that utilization.  The 
resulting literature on impact assessment of research initiatives therefore attempts to 
answer such questions as these: What constitutes policy influence?  To what degree and 
in what ways does research influence policy?  What factors and conditions facilitate or 
inhibit the policy impact potential of given research-based initiatives? (Nielson, 2001; 
Walter et al., 2003a and 2003b). 
Conceptual use of research (which brings about changes in levels of 
understanding, awareness, and attitudes) is often distinguished from instrumental or 
direct use of research (which results in changes in practice and policymaking).  Research 
impact therefore forms a continuum, from raising awareness of findings, through 
understanding of impacts, to changes in behavior.  Strategies to enhance research impact 
may address any point on this continuum.  Comprehensive research impact assessments 
thus should address various forms of impact including: changes in access to research; 
changes in the extent to which research is considered, referred to, or read; citations in 
documents; changes in awareness and understanding; changes in attitudes and beliefs; 
and changes in behavior.  Most research impact assessments focus on the most 
demanding levels of impact—i.e., objective behavior-based measures of impact—but fail 
to address the extent of impact at the subjective conceptual end of the spectrum (Walter 
et al., 2003a). 
Interventions to enhance research impact fall into eight broad categories: 
dissemination – presenting and circulating research findings in finished and tailored   23
forms; education – increasing knowledge and understanding of research findings; social 
influence – changing norms and values as a route to changing behavior; collaboration – 
improving flows of information and ideas among researchers and potential users by 
strengthening linkages; incentives – encouraging and rewarding activities that enhance 
research impact, or that conform to best practices; reinforcement – peer affirmation of 
impact-enhancing behavior and attitudes; facilitation – providing means to support and 
enable research-based policy and practice; and multifaceted initiatives – measures with 
two or more of the above mechanisms, seeking multiple integrated and mutually 
reinforcing impacts (Walter et al, 2003b).  The fable illustrates a multifaceted approach 
involving education, social influence, collaboration, and facilitation. 
This literature clearly harbors great promise for identifying research impact-
enhancing institutional innovations.  However, beyond narrowly defined quantitative 
analyses of net welfare gains accruing from investments in public research, systematic 
studies of research impact that address both conceptual and instrumental impacts are 
essentially non-existent for agriculture in Africa. 
 
Evidence-Based-Practice 
A relatively new field of inquiry has emerged driven by recognition that designing better 
mechanisms for pushing research information out (dissemination) is having only limited 
success in improving public policy.  This has led to a search for more effective ways of 
integrating evidence into policy, and encouraging utilization of evidence in practice, 
where “evidence” is taken to mean the results of systematic investigation toward 
increasing the sum of knowledge (i.e., research).  This agenda has focused not only on   24
the question of what works, and what interventions or strategies should be used to meet 
specified policy goals and identified client needs.  It has also addressed broader questions 
on know-how, know-who, and know-why that hinge more on tacit knowledge than they 
do on explicit knowledge. 
A major focus of attention in this literature is therefore on challenges facing 
practitioners concerned with policy implementation (Crewe and Young, 2002; Nutley et 
al., 2003b).  In addition to the familiar research-policy gap, two other gaps are identified: 
research-practice gaps; and policy-practice gaps.  Growing disillusionment over a lack of 
deep-rooted impact of research despite heavy investments in “policy outreach” by 
researchers and research organizations highlights the importance of these two largely 
unrecognized gaps in policy processes.  The research-practice gap pertains to lack of 
appropriate translation of evidence on what works in a particular field into actual 
practice.  In this context, research findings may be under-used, over-used, or misused.  
The policy-practice gap refers to poor translation of policy decisions into practice—e.g., 
moving from a policy to privatize state owned agencies to, say, open franchise bidding as 
the implementation approach.  Research findings may fail to inform policy, guide 
practice, or both. 
Bridging all three kinds of gaps hinges in the first instance on a fundamental 
reconceptualization of the role and aim of research in policy processes.  As noted earlier, 
in the traditional rational model, the assumed path followed by research in policy 
processes is linear: from creation through dissemination to utilization.  The rational 
model pays little attention to implementation, or to the practitioners charged with 
implementation.  By recognizing practitioners and placing the search for understanding of   25
their problems on par with examinations of challenges facing researchers and policy 
makers, the evidence-based-practice approach implies a shift in focus from a “researcher-
as-disseminator” paradigm to a “practitioner-as-learner” paradigm.  The former paradigm 
assigns a privileged position to research and researchers; the latter one assigns that status 
to practice and practitioners.  Interactions among: (1) the nature of available evidence; (2) 
the context within which that evidence is sourced and utilized (or otherwise) in 
implementation; and (3) the facilitative mechanisms available to various policy 
stakeholders are decisive.  Whether a particular piece of research-based evidence is 
pivotal or not in a given policy process is therefore a purely empirical matter, defined by 
the conduciveness (or otherwise) of extant contextual infrastructures and available 
facilitation mechanisms.  The fable from Uganda illustrates that research cannot be 
separated from its social and political context, and especially not from power relations 
that define facilitative (and convening) capabilities.  Processes with thin evidential 
foundations but deep facilitating powers (e.g,. the donor-driven processes in many 
African countries) may prevail over research-based ones. 
However appealing and compelling the ideas behind the evidence-based-practice 
school may be, they are still long on theory and short on empirical verification.  Indeed, 
even the extent to which policy processes can be evidence-based (vs. “evidence-
influenced” or “evidence-aware”) is controversial (Nutley, 2003; Nutley et al., 2003b).   
 
Implications 
Clearly, apart from the much-maligned rational model, a unified portable framework 
representing all policy processes and capturing all possible choices and tradeoffs faced in   26
bridging research, policy, and practice does not currently exist.  Each of the other five 
schools relaxes certain assumptions embedded within the rational model—e.g., wholly 
rational policy makers, procedural certainty, well-defined research questions, well-
defined user groups, well-defined channels of communication.  In so doing, the five other 
schools achieve greater realism but at the cost of clarity and tractability.  A unified 
portable framework is unlikely ever to emerge.  Its absence is a logical outcome of the 
context-specificity and social embeddedness of knowledge.  Contingent approaches that 
recognize and respond to that context-specificity and social embeddedness are required.  
As suggested by the evidence-based practice school, rewarding strategies will likely vary 
with opportunities and capacities for producing research-based evidence, for influencing 
context, and for designing facilitation mechanisms.  These conclusions are not sector-, or 
region-, or country-specific.  Rather, they spring from the nature of public policy in 
organized societies and from the functions that all political systems must perforce 
perform. 
Several implications for research and capacity strengthening emerge.  The fable 
and literature review suggest that the challenge is to identify institutional innovations that 
yield new bridging mechanisms. 
 
Research 
The eight categories of potential research impact-enhancing mechanisms listed earlier 
(dissemination, education, social influence, collaboration, incentives, reinforcement, 
facilitation, and multifaceted initiatives) suggest that the range of choice in potential 
interventions is wide, in theory.  In practice, that range is likely to be quite limited.    27
Ascertaining the factors that circumscribe the selection domain requires careful 
diagnostic analysis in the three dimensions proposed by the evidence-based practice 
school: first, the nature of the available evidence (both current and potential); second, the 
social and political context within which research and policy are practiced and embedded; 
and, third, the resources, structures, and processes available for facilitating change.  
Nothing works all the time.  Practitioners do not work in isolation.  Local circumstances 
always mediate implementation strategies.  Every initiative aiming to influence policy 
should therefore begin with such a diagnostic analysis. 
The fable from Uganda demonstrates that evidence bases, social and political 
contexts, and facilitation capabilities are likely diverse and complex.  Developing 
frameworks, working hypotheses, and protocols to guide the diagnostic analyses are 
immediate priorities.  The literature review reveals that such work is already underway, 
but not yet for agriculture, and not yet for agriculture in Africa.  Developing typologies of 
agricultural policy systems and processes in Africa based on theory and outcomes of 
several diagnostic analyses are longer-term aims.  The need for such typologies—which 
would capture particular evidence-context-facilitation scenarios (realizations)—is 
especially pressing for agriculture, given the complexity of the institutional and political 
environments within which agricultural policies are formulated and implemented, as 
derived from agriculture’s cross-sectoral (horizontal) imperative (Bonnen et al, 1997). 
 
Capacity Strengthening 
Ideally, the above-mentioned diagnostic analyses of agricultural policy processes would 
include assessments of key capacity gaps, again taking into account agricultural policy’s   28
horizontal imperative and the obvious need for priority setting.  The eight dimensions of 
potential research impact-enhancing interventions might define the relevant terrain. 
Continued investment in programs aiming to build individual capacities for 
generating explicit knowledge is crucial.  But the proposed conceptual shift from a 
“research-as-disseminator” framework to a “practitioner-as-learner” framework points to 
the need for initiatives aimed at groups (e.g, networks or clusters) of policy stakeholders 
in which producers of explicit knowledge (i.e., researchers) are neither leaders nor 
accorded privileged positions a priori. 
At bottom, the issue is how to promote “evidence-readiness” among inherently 
conservative and pragmatic policy makers and practitioners and “user-readiness” among 
inherently abstraction-oriented researchers.  The innovation diffusion and knowledge 
management literatures suggest that individual policy makers and practitioners will never 
be evidence-ready, and that individual researchers will never be user-ready, in the sense 
of being able to send and receive signals to and from one another.  These literatures 
suggest that individuals might become evidence-ready and user-ready, but only in tandem 
with others, and only if the incentives embedded in the contextual and facilitative 
infrastructures within which they operate are conducive to investment in risky, 
knowledge-intensive initiatives.  These conclusions raise tremendous challenges for 
capacity strengthening—challenges to which, as currently constituted, most agricultural 
research and policy systems in Africa would be unable to respond.  A graduated, 
contingent approach based on piloting initiatives would therefore be advisable.   29
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